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Abstract—While the first CCTV camera was developed almost
a century ago back in 1927, currently it is assumed as granted
there are about 770 millions CCTV cameras around the globe,
and their number is casually predicted to surpass 1 billion in
2021. Similarly to the first prototypes from 1927, at present the
main promoted benefits for using and deploying CCTV cameras
are the physical security, safety, and prophylactics of crime. At
the same time the increasing, widespread, unwarranted, and
unaccountable use of CCTV cameras globally raises privacy risks
and concerns for the last several decades. Recent technological
advances implemented in CCTV cameras such as AI-based facial
recognition and IoT connectivity only fuel further these concerns
raised by privacy-minded persons.
However, many of the debates, reports, and policies are
based on assumptions and numbers that are neither necessarily
factually accurate nor are based on sound methodologies. For
example, at present there is no accurate and global understanding
of how many CCTV cameras are deployed and in use, where are
those cameras located, who owns or operates those cameras, etc.
In addition, there are no proper (i.e., sound, accurate, advanced)
tools that can help us achieve such counting, localization, and
other information gathering. Therefore we cannot objectively
evaluate the state of the global video surveillance, its negative
effects on privacy, and its positive impact on safety. Currently
employed methods involve manual counting and positioning, us-
ing inflated “sales figures” and outdated/sparse/unvetted datasets,
and applying unjustified extrapolations. Obviously such tech-
niques are inaccurate, do not scale, do not provide a clear
picture, and do not provide a scientific base for reasoning, debate,
and policy-making. Therefore, new methods and tools must be
developed in order to detect, count, and localize the CCTV
cameras. Those methods must be scalable, accurate, based on
sound scientific approaches, and easily applicable in real-life.
To close this gap, with this paper we introduce the first and
only computer vision MS COCO-compatible models that are able
to accurately detect CCTV and video surveillance cameras in
images and video frames. To this end, our state-of-the-art detector
was built using 3401 images that were manually reviewed and
annotated, and achieves an accuracy between 91,1% – 95,6%.
Moreover, we build and evaluate multiple models, present a
comprehensive comparison of their performance, and outline core
challenges associated with such research. We also present possible
privacy-, safety-, and security-related practical applications of
our core work. Last but not least, we release as open-data and
† This paper is based on author’s MSc thesis [1].
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open-source relevant data and code that can be used to validate
and further extend our work.
Index Terms—CCTV, cameras, video surveillance, privacy,
safety, computer vision, object detection, machine learning, open-
source, open-data, datasets
I. INTRODUCTION
CCTV and video surveillance cameras represent nowadays
some of the most ubiquitous technology, and it is almost
impossible to live a day without getting into the field of view
of at least one CCTV camera [2]. At present, CCTV cameras
are an integral part of any infrastructure (e.g., cities, buildings,
streets, businesses), and it is expected that by 2021 there will
be more than 1 billion CCTV cameras globally [3]. Mean-
while, the earliest known CCTV-precursor goes back as early
as 1927 when the Soviet inventor Leon Theremin installed
the first real-world usable prototypes of then-called distance
vision along the Kremlin premises [4]. It was a mechanically-
operated device that transmitted a few hundred image-lines
which allowed however the user operator to distinguish and
recognize faces.
When it comes to cybersecurity, CCTV cameras are already
known to be the subject of numerous cyberattacks [5], and
they were also the main culprit behind the now legendary and
massive attack by the Mirai IoT botnet [6]. At the same time,
it is long and well known that CCTV cameras raise concerns
and pose risks related to privacy [7]–[11]. However, it is very
hard (if not impossible) at present to accurately and objectively
assess and address the privacy risks and implications of certain
claims or facts. For example, in order to assess how serious
is a privacy risk of a certain CCTV installation, we need to
identify and count precisely the CCTV cameras, and we need
to know exactly where the cameras are located along with
their other characteristics such as field of view, zoom levels,
and other built-in features (e.g., face recognition, Infra-Red
(IR), Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ)).
Unfortunately, most of the current data publicly available
about CCTV cameras statistics and characteristics, both at
global and local levels, can be considered completely unre-
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liable. As follows, we provide several such examples that
demonstrate the unsound methodologies and discrepancy in
data. In one instance, UK had until 2014 three different
major estimations about the number of CCTV cameras – 1.8
mil. [12], 4.2 mil. [13], and 5.9 mil. [14]. To add insult to
the injury, despite the rampant increase of CCTV and video
surveillance globally, these numbers were not updated ever
since, and are referenced in 2019–2020 as “current” by various
reports and media outlets. In another instance, the estimates for
global number of CCTV cameras vary between 25 mil. [15]
and 770 mil. [3] – a whopping 25x discrepancy. In yet another
instance, UK finds that on average a person enters a CCTV
camera view 300 times a day [15]. A similar study in US puts
that number at 50+ times a day, despite the more worrying fact
that the average US respondent assumed it was 4 cameras or
less [16] – at least a 10x lower presumed privacy risk and
exposure than in reality. At the same time, a recent journalist
experiment in NYC (US) by Pasley [2] found he encountered
CCTV cameras face-to-face at least 49 times, and that is
just counting a single trip to the workplace. Finally, there
are also discrepancies related to number of cameras per 1000
persons [12], [14], [17].
A quick check reveals that such discrepancies may have
several root-causes. In some cases, it is the use of unsound
and low-tech methods, such as visually counting CCTV cam-
eras on a single main shopping street in London, and then
extrapolating (by some unvetted model) the numbers to the
entire country [13]. In other cases, it is the heavy use of sales
and marketing data [3], which by our experience very often
is unrepresentative, highly approximated, and over-estimated.
Even if we would assume the rightfulness of counting data
provided by such unscientific methods, they cannot however
provide the privacy-critical information about any camera,
namely its location, characteristics (e.g., field of view, zoom),
and spatial coverage.
There are many ways to mitigate the privacy risks posed
by CCTV cameras (including their additional features such
as face recognition). One possible way is to use artistic (but
perhaps unpractical and low-tech) methods such as specially-
designed transparent plastic masks [18] or face painting (i.e.,
“adversarial computer vision” attack) [19]. However, these
methods could be easily defeated as the advances in computer
vision and face recognition are extremely fast, allowing correct
identification through face recognition even when the subjects
wear respiratory masks [20].
Another possible way is to develop, provide and use ap-
propriate high-tech tools against the invasion of privacy by
CCTV cameras. Examples of such tools include CCTV-aware
route planning and navigation, and real-time early warning
system when mobile and embedded devices that are video-
input equipped (e.g., wearable devices, smartphones, drones)
enter areas under the potential field of view of CCTV cameras.
Therefore, such tools require trustworthy object detection
and counting, and accurate mapping and localization. In this
context, computer vision is a proven method that excellently
performs for object detection and counting [21], as well as for
mapping and localization [22], [23].
In this paper we try to close the existing fundamental
research and technology gap , and to address the strong and
imminent need in such tools. To this end, we developed
the first and state-of-the-art CCTV camera object detector
using latest computer vision techniques. We also prototype
and discuss CCTV-aware privacy-oriented applications that
build atop of our detectors. During the experiments on real-
world data, our system achieved an accuracy between 91,1%
– 95,6%, which is comparable to Google’s original automatic
system for large-scale privacy protection of human faces and
car license plates in Google Street View [24].
A. Contributions
• We are the first to research, implement and evaluate the
state-of-the-art Computer Vision (CV) models to detect
CCTV camera objects in images and video frames.
• We release as open data the models and datasets necessary
to validate our results and to further expand the datasets and
the research field. To our knowledge, these are the first, the
largest, and the best-performing datasets and models to be
publicly released for solving the stated problems.
• We are first to introduce and motivate a handful of CCTV-
aware applications for both privacy and safety scenarios as
relevant for modern digitized lifestyle.
• We release the relevant artefacts (e.g., code,
datasets, trained models, and documentation) at:
https://github.com/Fuziih and https://etsin.fairdata.
fi/dataset/d2d2d6e2-0b5c-46e0-8833-53d8a24838a0
(urn:nbn:fi:att:258ce5ad-9501-46b9-a707-c1f59689ee10).
B. Paper organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we overview the related work. We detail our methodology
and describe our experimental setup in Section III. Then,
in Section IV we present our results and main findings. In
Section V we discuss the caveats, possible applications, and
future work. Finally, we conclude with Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK AND STATE OF THE ART
A. Object Detection Systems
1) Detectron2 [25]: is “Facebook AI Research (FAIR)’s
next generation software system that implements state-of-the-
art object detection algorithms”. It is a complete rewrite of
the open source object detection platform Detectron [26],
and originated from FAIR’s successful maskrcnn-benchmark
project [27]. FAIR suggests that the modularity of the frame-
work grants the users flexibility and extensibility to train and
use state-of-the-art object detection algorithms with various
system configurations ranging from single GPU PCs to multi-
GPU clusters [25].
2) CenterMask2 [28]: is an upgraded implementation of
CenterMask [29] for the Detectron2 [25] framework. Center-
Mask (CM) and CenterMask2 (CM2) are segmentation-based
architectures built upon the Fully Convolutional One-Stage
Object (FCOS) architecture [30]. In essence, CenterMask is a
three-part architecture consisting of VoVNet2 [31] backbone
(for feature extraction), detection head (lifted from FCOS),
and the mask head.
At its core, CenterMask/CenterMask2 predicts the object
centerpoint locations from an image, and estimates the key-
points of the object. Then feature representation at the center
point is lifted, and it forms the local shape of an object.
Local shape is, in essence, a coarse mask over the object
that separates the detected object from everything else close
by. During this operation, the backbone assembles a global
saliency map of the image at pixel level. This map separates
the foreground from the background. Finally, the local shapes
and global saliency maps are assembled to create the final
instance maps [29].
3) TridentNet [32]: approaches the object detection chal-
lenge through the problem of scale variation of the detected
objects. Its authors propose scale-aware Trident Networks
concept, which aims to create scale-specific activation maps.
The network uses multi-branch architecture with equal trans-
formation parameters, but different kernel receptive fields.
In addition, a scale-aware training process specializes every
branch with specific scale of objects [32].
TridentNet uses its own approach to extract features of
different scale. Using dilated convolutions [33], different
branches share the network structure producing comparable
features but having different scales due to the receptive field
variance. Dilated convolution is then applied to the branches
with varying dilation rates. This means that convolutions are
performed at sampled locations, which are chosen sparsely.
In turn, this increases the size of the receptive field. The
receptive fields are therefore accommodated to different scales
of objects. This multi-branch regime could introduce many
new parameters as the branch count increases. TridentNet
however, introduces weight sharing to the process. As the
branches are identical, except the receptive field dilation
rate, weight sharing ideally fits the purpose. Therefore, same
parameters are trained for different object scales. To combat
scale mismatch caused by the predefined dilation rates in the
multi-branch architecture, Li et al. [32] propose scale-aware
training, which selects correct ranges in the branches for each
pair of < proposal, ground truth >.
4) ATSS [34]: starts from the premise that a key differ-
ence between anchor and anchor-free detectors is how they
characterize their positive and negative samples. The Adaptive
Training Sample Selection (ATSS) uses the object’s statistical
characteristics to select the sample accordingly. With ATSS,
Zhang et al. [34] leveled the playing field between the promi-
nent detectors – anchor-based RetinaNet [35] and anchor-free
FCOS [30]. They achieved this by setting key configurations
similarly, therefore introducing almost similar performance
(37% vs. 37.8% in MS COCO [36] minival subset). With the
introduction of these similar configurations, the authors were
able to determine that the differences between the two detec-
tors boiled down to how they determine two core things – the
positive and negative samples (classification) and the starting
point for the bounding boxes (regression). The authors allow
only one anchor box per location when using RetinaNet [35]
as this procedure is close to the methodology of FCOS [30].
Otherwise, by default RetinaNet [35] pushes nine anchors
per location. With further testing, ATSS authors concluded
that when the sample selection of the detectors is similar,
the effects of the bounding box regression starting point on
performance of FCOS is negligible. Therefore, it makes the
manner of classification an irrelevant difference between the
detectors. ATSS tests conclude that training sample selection is
an essential aspect of the training performance of any detector,
and therefore an interesting avenue for research [34].
B. Object Detection Datasets
Lin et al. [36] proposed a novel dataset for general object
detection called Microsoft’s Common Objects in COntext
(COCO, or MS COCO). The most recent (2017) update of
MS COCO has a fully annotated training dataset contain-
ing 118000 images and a 5000 image validation dataset. In
addition, a 41000 image testing dataset is also available.
There are more than 80 different classes for state-of-the-art
object detector testing with the MS COCO [37], including
pedestrians, traffic lights, cars, and even teddy-bears. However,
it does not contain object detection models for CCTV cameras,
though they are currently an indispensable part of any street
and city infrastructure such as traffic lights and road signs.
PASCAL Visual Object Classes (VOC) [38] project ran
object detection challenges between 2005–2012 [39]. For
the 2012 object detection challenge, PASCAL VOC dataset
labeled 20 classes with both training and validation datasets,
and provided more than 11000 images totaling over 27000
instances [40]. The dataset contained several similar classes
to increase difficulty [41].
ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
(ILSVRC) [42] is an ongoing annual object category clas-
sification and detection challenge that has been run since
2010. Russakovsky et al. [42] envisioned ILSVRC to follow
PASCAL VOC [38] footsteps in providing a challenging
dataset and hosting competitions. ImageNet provides about
1.2 million images for training and around 150000 images for
validation and testing. ImageNet has 1000 classification labels,
of which 200 were originally chosen for object detection
challenges [42].
Open Images Dataset V6 contains over 9 million annotated
images for a total of more than 15 million bounding boxes
covering about 600 object classes [43]. The Open Images
project holds the annual Robust Vision Challenges, and their
goal of is to further improve the development of computer
vision systems [44].
In this context, our work is novel and perfectly extends the
state of the art by contributing both the methods (e.g., scripts),
as well as annotated data and trained models necessary for
object detection of two classes of CCTV cameras (directed
and round – see Section III-A).
C. Computer vision / object detection on street-level imagery
There are numerous companies and projects capturing and
serving street-level imagery such as Google Street View,
EveryScape, Mapjack, Microsoft StreetSide, Yandex Street
Panoramas, OpenStreetCam, Mappilary. Such imagery allows
much richer online and offline experiences boosted by techno-
logical advances in Computer Vision (CV), Machine Learning
(ML), Natural Language Processing (NLP) with text mining,
Virtual/Augmented/eXtended Reality (VR, AR, XR). Overall,
capturing street-level imagery presents both tremendous chal-
lenges and opportunities [45].
Paiva [46] used ”computer vision to infer urban indicators
on google street view”. Wojna et al. [47] presented a method
for ”extraction of structured information from street view
imagery”. Hara et al. [48]–[51] used ”google street view using
crowdsourcing, computer vision, and machine learning” for an
extensive set of detections and challenges related to street-level
accessibility for persons with special needs. Frome et al. [24]
presented methods for large-scale privacy protection in Google
Street View imagery. Using their fully automatic system the
authors were ”able to sufficiently blur more than 89% of
faces and 94–96% of license plates in evaluation sets sampled
from Google Street View imagery”. Related to the accurate
mapping of an image based on street-level imagery, Zamir and
Shah [52] introduced methods for image localization using
Google Street View with an accuracy comparable to GPS-
based technology.
However, none of the existing works attempted to perform
detection and accurate location mapping of CCTV camera
objects from street-level imagery. In this context, our work
is the first to achieve this and perfectly extends the state of
the art by accurately detecting CCTV cameras on both street-
level and other imagery (both geo-tagged and not).
D. Face recognition, privacy and CCTV/IP cameras
Face recognition is a very hot topic, has been a prolific areas
of research, and there is an immense body of works [53]–[59].
At the same time, (near) real-time face detection, tracking, and
recognition is one of the core applications of CCTV cameras
which is increasingly gaining traction. Several papers have
been released on the subject of facial detection and recognition
in real-time recordings such as the ones in CCTV setups.
Halawa et al. [60] recently showed how the Faster R-CNN [61]
algorithm is used with face detection in CCTV systems.
Once a face is detected from a recording, an image can be
stored for facial recognition by a slower algorithm, which
can extract features from it. Bah and Ming [62] presented
their facial recognition algorithm. Their method includes pre-
possessing the images to better capture facial features and
then implementing their own Local Binary Pattern (LBP)
algorithm [56]. Mileva and Burton [63] demonstrated the use
of facial recognition in a noisy real-life environment such as
in CCTV camera footage. The authors conclude that facial
recognition from CCTV footage is certainly an arduous task
and prone to errors [63]. Worse, erroneous face recognition
results may lead to arrests of innocent persons, such as the
infamous case of Steve Talley who got arrested twice in two
separate bank robbery cases and both times the arrests were
found to be wrong [64].
However, large CCTV networks may provide unaccountable
access to their video streams, turning them into tools of
mass illegal surveillance. For example, a recent journalist
investigation in Russia demonstrated that it is extremely easy
to acquire access to high-quality video feeds of almost 200k
state-operated CCTV cameras within Moscow’s digital surveil-
lance network [65]. Additionally, the researchers were able
for a fee to get access to the “face search” feature, where
the requestor provides a photo containing a “reference face”.
Then, the facial recognition sub-system of the CCTV network
provides back an extensive list of exact geo-locations (and
other meta information) where similarly matching faces were
previously seen within the CCTV network. The access to
video feeds and to the “face search” feature is allegedly sold
for a very low fee on underground and specialized forums
by unscrupulous law enforcement officers (i.e., a particular
instance of the insider threat [66], [67]).
In this context, our research, through the automated CCTV
camera detection (having as immediate goal accurate mapping
of camera geo-locations and characteristics) aims to provide
users with tools for a more democratic use of technology
where privacy controls are on the users’ side. For example,
such tools may help the users to make an informed and real-
time decision whether they want to be (or not!) in an area
within the field of view of CCTV cameras.
E. Cybersecurity and CCTV/IP cameras
Recent research demonstrated that the state of cybersecurity
for IoT devices (including DVRs and CCTV/IP cameras) and
their firmware is very bad [68]–[70]. Back in 2013, indepen-
dently and almost simultaneously Heffner [71], Costin [72],
Shekyan and Harutyunyan [73] researched and presented about
vulnerabilities, exploits and cybersecurity dangers related to
vulnerable and exposed CCTV/IP/surveillance cameras. In par-
ticular, [72] proposed several hypotheses related to (in)security
of CCTV/IP cameras, which were later extended and sys-
tematized in [5], and we summarize some of them below.
One research observation was the dangerous potential of easy
“harvesting” of vulnerable cameras into botnets. Another hy-
pothesis was the realistic possibility of massive unauthorized
access to video feeds for various illegal or unethical purposes,
including blackmailing or extortion 1 as well as “person
search” driven for example by missing persons alerts, “head
bounties” or other surveillance motives 2. Unsurprisingly,
in 2013–2014 reports started to surface about the infamous
(and supposedly Russian-operated) Insecam project [74], [75],
which at its peak featured between 100-200k video feeds
from vulnerable/insecure CCTV/IP cameras connected to the
internet. Moreover, in late 2016 news broke about the infamous
and devastating Mirai IoT botnet [6], [76]. It featured the
largest known DDoS attacks to date of over 1 TB/s, employed
at peak about 600k devices, took down major parts of the
1Proposed also in 2017 by Antonakakis et al. [6].
2Discovered in late 2019 to be happening in Russia [65] – see more in
Section II-D
Fig. 1. Examples of directed camera class (images CC0 by unsplash.com).
internet, and mostly consisted of hacked CCTV/IP cameras
and CCTV/DVR surveillance systems.
While this work does not explicitly address the cyberse-
curity of CCTV cameras, one possible offensive scenario to
consider is presented in Section V-C.
III. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
As with any Computer Vision (CV) object detector, we
followed a two-phase approach. First, we trained multiple
models for object detection with our “training dataset”. In
order to train the CV object detectors, we split the phase
into four parts – dataset gathering (Section III-A), image
annotation (Section III-B), environment setup (Section III-C),
and model training (Section III-D). Then, we evaluated each
trained model against a “test dataset” which was kept the
same for all the models at any given evaluation point (see
Section IV).
A. Dataset gathering
When we started to gather the dataset, we made a practical
decision that we want to be able to classify the cameras into
at least two distinct classes based on their shape – directed
cameras and round cameras. Having this information allows
us in the future work to model more accurately their field of
view coverage in 3D, therefore allowing to decide whether a
particular point in space (e.g., sidewalk, street, street corner)
provides or not privacy to a person.
Directed cameras include box- and bullet-shaped cameras
(see Figure 1), and we assume such cameras record a limited
field of view specifically in the direction they are pointed
to. Some of them may be motorized (e.g., via Pan-Tilt-Zoom
(PTZ) hardware and protocols) and therefore be able to have
a mobile field of view (in theory up to 360◦). However, it is
challenging (if not impossible) to detect PTZ with computer
vision on static (and low resolution) images. Therefore, to sim-
plify a bit our experiments and future geo-mapping modeling,
we assume that such cameras are static, cover the particular
direction they are pointed to, and have limited vertical and
horizontal fields of view.
Fig. 2. Examples of round camera class (images CC0 by unsplash.com).
Round cameras include dome- and sphere-shaped cameras
(see Figure 2), and we assume such cameras potentially
record a 360◦ field of view. Even though some dome- and
sphere-shaped cameras host inside a static and directed camera
sensor, most of the times it is challenging to know that
because of the reflective glass. Therefore, to simplify a bit
our experiments and future geo-mapping modeling, we assume
that such cameras record a 360◦ field of view.
1) Training and validation datasets: Our training dataset
contains 3401 images for a total of 2244 directed class in-
stances and 1742 round class instances. Our validation dataset
contains 528 images for a total of 348 directed class instances
and 269 round class instances, marking about 15, 5% split
between training and validation datasets. For the datasets,
we used the MS COCO format as this made it easy to use
several object detection architectures out of the box (see
Section III-D), and it also allowed instance segmentation
detection thanks to the polygon annotation possibility.
2) Testing dataset: For evaluation purposes (see Sec-
tion IV), we gathered a separate test dataset. The test dataset
contained only street-level imagery sources such as Open-
StreetCam [77] and Google Street View [78]. The test dataset
is intended to serve as an indicator how well our trained
models will work as CCTV camera detectors specifically for
street-level imagery sources since such sources are the primary
use case proposed for future work. Our test dataset contains
186 images for a total of 126 instances of directed cameras
class and 105 instances of the round cameras class.
B. Image annotation
Since we use supervised training at this stage, we have to
label and annotate the images in our datasets. To annotate the
images, we used Wada’s Labelme tool [79]. Labelme is heavily
inspired from the work by Russell et al. [80] who created
LabelMe, which is a web-based image annotation and labeling
tool. Wada’s Labelme [79] allows annotation with polygon
segments that can be used in object segmentation architectures
such as Mask-RCNN [81] and CenterMask [29]. When using
object segmentation, the outlines of the objects can be identi-
fied more precisely instead of a mere bounding box around the
object of interest. Also, Wada’s Labelme outputs individual
JSON files for each annotated image, and includes Python
scripts to embed the data as a single annotation file in MS
COCO format [79]. We annotated the final versions of our
datasets (i.e., training, validation, testing) with polygon shapes,
and converted the datasets to MS COCO-compliant format.
We also saved the individual JSON annotation files for future
reference. For example, they may be useful when annotation
changes are needed, or when a different splitting of the dataset
into training and validation subsets is required.
C. Environment setup
1) Hardware: Object detector training requires a lot of
system resources, especially with the larger backbones and
with increasing dataset sizes. We trained our models on su-
percomputer cluster that is part of a National Super Computing
Grid. The supercomputer we used in our experiments employs
682 CPU nodes, and its performance can theoretically peak at
1.8 petaflops. Each node has two 20 core Intel Xeon Cascade
Lake processors running at 2.1 GHz. It also features an “AI
partition” that includes 80 GPU nodes with four Nvidia Tesla
V100 32GB GPGPUs each, totaling 320 GPGPUs. The total
theoretical performance of the GPGPUS is 2.7 petaflops. The
nodes carry 384 GB of main memory and 3.6 TB quick local
storage. For our experiments, we used one node that employs
four Nvidia Tesla V100 32GB GPGPUs. We also performed
some intermediate tests on our group’s HPC GPU mini-cluster.
It features two Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4 CPUs totaling 20 cores
running at 2.40 GHz, and includes eight Nvidia Tesla P100
16 GB GPGPUs. For our experiments, we used four Nvidia
Tesla P100 16GB GPGPUs.
2) Software: In Table I we present a detailed list of software
used during our experiments. The majority of software in our
experiments is based on (or is written in) Python, and the
frameworks in our experiments were implemented in PyTorch.
To work with HPC clusters, we also needed to set up a Python
environment with several needed libraries and packages. In
order to achieve the setup, a virtual environment is required.
Therefore, we used Conda [82] which is an open-source vir-
tual environment and package manager. Furthermore, Conda
enabled us to install and use different matching versions of
packages and libraries, and it also isolated them to the specific
virtual environment, making the experimentation and failure
less painful and more streamlined. In particular, we used
Miniconda3 variant since we did not require the features of
the bulkier Anaconda3 package.
D. Model training
In order to train our CCTV camera detection models, we
used the three frameworks that are state-of-the-art with top
results. At the time of the experiments these are Center-
Mask2 [28], ATSS [34], and TridentNet [32]. Below we detail
the experimental setups and parameters, that allowed us to
evaluate and compare in the end six different object detectors,
that are summarized in Table II. The best parameters values
TABLE I
DETAILS OF SOFTWARE AND TOOLS USED TO PERFORM THE
EXPERIMENTS.
Software Name Version Purpose
Python 3.8.1 Python core
cudatoolkit 10.1.243 GPU programming
albumentations 0.4.3 Image augmentation library
numpy 1.18.1 Scientific computing package
OpenCV 4.2.0.32 Computer vision library
PyTorch 1.4.0 Machine learning framework
torchvision 0.5.0 Computer vision package
matplotlib 3.1.3 Graph visualizations
pycocotools 2.0 Tools for MS COCO
tqdm 4.42.1 Progress bar for terminal use
pillow 7.0.0 Imaging library (PIL fork)
cython 0.29.15 C-Extensions for Python
ninja 1.9.0 Small build system
pandas 1.0.1 Data analysis library
requests 2.23.0 HTTP library
scipy 1.4.1 Mathematics and science library
yacs 0.1.6 Configurations management system
Tensorboard 2.1.1 Training data capture
Detectron2 0.1.1 Object detection framework
QCC 8.3.0 GNU Compiler Collection
CUDA 10.1.168 Nvidia CUDA
labelme 4.2.9 Annotation tool
ATSS ATSS - detector
CenterMask2 CenterMask - detector (PyTorch)
TridentNet TridentNet - detector
detectron2-pipeline Modular image processing pipeline
we chose were found by referencing the documentation, fol-
lowing best practices from the state-of-the-art, and performing
multiple trial experiments.
1) CenterMask2: We trained our CenterMask2 [28], [29]
with VoVNet-V2 [31] as backbone using the V-57-eSE, V-
99-eSE, V-39-eSe (lightweight) variants. Throughout the paper
we refer to these models as CM2 Lite V-39, CM2 V-57, and
CM2 V-99 respectively. First, we set the maximum iterations
to 45000 with (i.e., 0.5x of the CenterMask2’s “1x learning
rate” schedule which translates to default 90000 iterations).
However, we found that we get even better results at 20000–
30000 iterations checkpoint. In order to increase the training
speed while still remaining under the Video-RAM (VRAM)
threshold and also positively effect the results [83], we incre-
mented the batch size from its default (16) to 24. The base
learning rate was kept at default of 0.01., and enabled the
multi-scale training at 640, 672, 704, 736, 768, and 800 pixels
(measuring the smaller side of the input image). While keeping
most of the configuration similar, the V-39-eSe (lightweight)
has some specifics, such as accepting 580 and 600 pixel size
input.
2) ATSS: When training our ATSS [34], we used the
ResNet-50 [84] and ResNeXt-101 [85] backbones with multi-
scale training and deformable convolutions. Both backbones
used deformable convolutional networks version 2. Through-
out the paper we refer to these models as ATSS R-50, and
ATSS X-101 respectively. The latter backbone has the ResNeXt
cardinality set at 64, and the bottleneck width at 4d. Cardinal-
ity and bottleneck width are hyperparameters for aggregated
residual transformations. They represent improvements made
for ResNeXt by Xie et al. [85] over the original ResNet [84]
backbone. The cardinality is the number of paths inside the
ResNeXt block. Bottleneck width is the number of individual
channels in the bottleneck layers. The concept behind the
ResNeXt block is split-transform-aggregate. The idea is that
instead of growing the network deeper or wider, increasing
the cardinality will increase accuracy and keep complexity
of the network low [85]. Similarly to other models, we set
the maximum iterations to 45000, with best results produced
likewise around 20000–30000 iterations checkpoint. We left
the base learning rate at 0.01, and used a batch size of 32.
Since these are bigger backbones, we chose for multi-scale
input image sizes of 640 and 800 pixels.
3) TridentNet: We performed training of our Trident-
Net [32] using the ResNet-101 [84] C4 backbone. Throughout
the paper we refer to this model as Trident R-101. The C4
variant uses the features extracted from the ResNet’s fourth
stage, while the fifth stage serves as Region of Interest (RoI)
heads [81]. Similarly to other models, we set the maximum
iterations to 45000, with best results produced likewise around
20000–30000 iterations checkpoint. We employed the standard
three-branch scheme for the TridentNet multi-branch variant.
Multi-scale training was also enabled at 640, 672, 704, 736,
768, and 800 pixels (measuring the smaller side of the input
image). We also left the base learning rate at 0.02, and used
a batch size of 24.
E. Various enhancements
1) Image alterations: We also propose and explore the
effect of “image alteration” on the performance of our trained
models [86]. By “image alterations” in our case we mean auto-
adjust of contrast, equalizer, exposure, and hue-saturation.
Results improvement with “image alteration” vary across the
models. On the one hand, ATTS model seems to improve
performance on contrast-enhanced images. Likewise, Center-
Mask2 detector enjoys a various degree of improvement in all
cases of “image alteration”, however once again the contrast-
enhanced images demonstrated top improvement results. On
the other hand, TridentNet showed a decrease in confidence
levels when used with “image alteration”, even though in
isolated cases it enabled the model to correctly improve certain
false negatives into true positives.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
All the models were tested separately with both the vali-
dation dataset as well as with a separate testing dataset (see
Section III-A). As mentioned earlier, the testing dataset mainly
features images from street-level maps, since this corresponds
to the intended use for the detector model. However, as we
demonstrate in Appendix A, our system performs as expected
even with arbitrary images acquired by third-parties using
smartphones.
Table II shows the full detector and backbone combination
along with the training iteration count for each model that
provided the best performance for the whole training session.
TABLE II
DETECTOR CONFIGURATION, ITERATIONS COUNT, TRAINING AND
INFERENCE TIMES (BOLD=BEST, UNDERLINE=WORST).
Detector
Best-result
iterations
(number)
Weights
file size
(MB)
Avg. train
time / iter.
(seconds)
Avg. inference
time / image
(seconds)
CM2 Lite V-39 20000 281.1 0.28 0.061
CM2 V-57 20000 551.4 0.81 0.089
CM2 V-99 30000 776.0 1.22 0.109
ATSS R-50 30000 264.1 0.48 0.064
ATSS X-101 22500 718.7 2.40 0.132
Trident R-101 20000 421.9 1.59 0.169
Additionally, Table II presents the timings for training and
inference under each detection model.
A. Metrics for evaluation
To evaluate our models, we used pycocotools and MS
COCO evaluator built into Detectron2 [25]. For all the models
trained, we used the same evaluator. The metrics we use
and present are the standard MS COCO’s [36] evaluation
metrics. To evaluate the performance of a detector for the
detection performance, MS COCO employs 12 characterizing
metrics. Average Precision (AP) with MS COCO represents,
in essence, a mean Average Precision (mAP) which takes
the precision average across all the classes, all the while
localization accuracy is built into the precision metrics. MS
COCO’s standard measurement nowadays is largely repre-
sented by Average Precision (AP) and Average Recall (AR),
where the average is taken on 10 IoU thresholds from 0.5
to 0.95 with a 0.05 interval. AP across scales takes into
account the area of pixels within the segmentation mask or
the bounding box. In this context, based on the pixel size of
the detected segmentation mask or the bounding box – “small
objects” means areas up to 32x32 pixels, “medium objects” fit
areas between 32x32 and 96x96 pixels, and “large objects”
are represented by areas beyond 96x96 pixels. While AR also
has the three metrics, the differentiating factor is the amount
of detections per image – 1, 10, and 100. AR across scales is
comparable to AP across scales [37]. The latest MS COCO
metrics heavily weight on the localization with the Intersection
over Union (IoU) threshold from 0.5 to 0.95. With our main
and immediate use cases, the exact localization might not be
absolutely necessary, therefore the precision with 0.5 IoU (i.e.,
AP@0.5) is the metric that is relevant in our case. However, in
the spirit of evaluations and metrics used within the state-of-
the-art detectors and backbones, we also collect, compute and
present the most commonly used metrics (see Tables III IV).
In Table III we present the metrics (bounding box detection)
for the “testing dataset”. The results suggest that the classifica-
tion and the false positives are extremely good. For example,
the AP@0.5 metric for all modes has excellent scores from
high 80s percentile to mid 90s. At the same time, the results
demonstrate that the localization accuracy (which is built into
all precision metrics) suffers a bit. Therefore it affects some
results and we can see that the precision metric with IoU from
0.5 to 0.95 takes a hit (i.e., AP@0.5:0.95), as for example is
the case of ATSS X-101 model where its AP@0.5:0.95 tops
at only 65, 4%. The metrics showcase that smaller objects
(e.g., images with CCTV cameras that are either distant or
are really small size in real-life) seem to pose a challenge for
all the models when compared to the medium size objects.
The increase of object instances in an image does not seem
to affect the models too much.
In Table IV we show the detection metrics (bounding box
detection) for the “validation dataset”. Except for the case of
small objects, the metrics for the “validation dataset” are not
far superior when compared to the results of “testing dataset”
(see Table III).
B. Visual result samples
To facilitate the understanding of successes, failures, and
challenges faced by our detectors, we present in this section
a selection of relevant samples along with some comments.
Figure 3 presents a relatively easy example of a side facing
directed class instance. The minor challenge is the low contrast
between the color of the camera and the background (i.e., color
of the building). All detectors work well, while TridentNet
achieves 100% confidence.
Fig. 3. Visual results (Ground Truth - 1 TP) (left to right): CenterMask2 V-57
- 1 TP (79%); ATSS X-101 - 1 TP (81%); TridentNet R-101 - 1 TP (100%)
Figure 4 features a side installation of a round class instance.
Every model detects the camera correctly, and once again
TridentNet achieves 100% confidence.
Fig. 4. Visual results (Ground Truth - 1 TP) (left to right): CenterMask2 V-57
- 1 TP (84%); ATSS X-101 - 1 TP (81%); TridentNet R-101 - 1 TP (100%)
Figure 5 shows a side facing directed class instance, which
blends by color and texture with the background. None of
the models detects the camera, and the outcome is a false
negative for each model. This indicates that the dataset requires
instances for training that are considered “hard examples” such
as this one.
Fig. 5. Visual results (Ground Truth - 1 TP) (left to right): CenterMask2 V-57
- 1 FN; ATSS X-101 - 1 FN; TridentNet R-101 - 1 FN. NOTE: Undetected
TPs are marked with pink circle.
Figure 6 presents one of the worst-performing samples
of the whole dataset. None of the models is able to detect
side facing round class instance that also perfectly blends
with the white background. At the same time, all of the
detectors produce multiple false positives representing in fact
light fixtures. One solution to this problem is to introduce
into the training dataset the light fixtures (and similar potential
false positive) as background (i.e., non-camera class labels). To
further complicate this challenge, there is a growing number
of hybrid installations where the CCTV cameras are combined
with (Figure 7) or incorporated into light poles [87]. We leave
the resolution for this challenge as future work.
Fig. 6. Visual results (Ground Truth - 1 TP) (left to right): CenterMask2
V-57 - 6 FP, 1 FN; ATSS X-101 - 3 FP, 1 FN; TridentNet R-101 - 2 FP, 1
FN. NOTE: Undetected TPs are marked with pink circle.
Next, we present some examples and results where we
applied the “image alteration” techniques (Section III-E), thus
seeking improvements in confidence levels and TP/TN/FP
values that are as close as possible to the Ground Truth (GT).
For Figure 8, the CenterMask2 applied over the initial
input image (omitted due to space constraints) detected all
3 TPs with the following confidence levels – 89%, 69%, 48%.
With “image alteration” we can observe much better results
with contrast, equalizer, and exposure modifications, where the
equalizer case seems to bring the optimal result.
At the same time, “image alteration” does not always bring
result improvements. For example, as seen with Figure 9
TridentNet mode had no improvements on the detection, and
the other models produced similarly unimproved outputs.
TABLE III
RESULTS FOR BOUNDING BOX DETECTION WITH THE TEST DATASET (BOLD=BEST, UNDERLINE=WORST).
Detector AP@0.5 AP@0.5:0.95 APs APm AR 1 AR 10 ARs ARm
CM2 Lite V-39 88,2% 63,8% 65,4% 68,7% 61,0% 73,4% 69,7% 78,8%
CM2 V-57 89,7% 62,9% 62,8% 66,3% 61,5% 71,5% 65,7% 79,5%
CM2 V-99 90,1% 64,9% 64,3% 70,2% 61,5% 72,9% 68,1% 79,7%
ATSS R-50 86,5% 58,2% 57,4% 63,9% 56,8% 66,0% 60,7% 73,5%
ATSS X-101 91,1% 65,4% 64,4% 70,1% 61,6% 72,3% 67,2% 79,4%
Trident R-101 88,3% 58,7% 56,0% 65,4% 56,3% 65,8% 58,5% 76,0%
TABLE IV
RESULTS FOR BOUNDING BOX DETECTION WITH THE VALIDATION DATASET (BOLD=BEST, UNDERLINE=WORST).
Detector AP@0.5 AP@0.5:0.95 APs APm APl AR 1 AR 10 ARs ARm ARl
CM2 Lite V-39 93,9% 69,9% 49,9% 72,1% 77,1% 71,1% 76,5% 54,5% 77,5% 85,6%
CM2 V-57 95,6% 74,5% 57,4% 75,9% 81,1% 74,6% 80,3% 60,5% 81,0% 88,0%
CM2 V-99 95,0% 73,3% 55,5% 74,0% 82,1% 74,0% 79,5% 58,8% 79,4% 89,3%
ATSS R-50 93,2% 71,7% 52,3% 74,4% 77,6% 72,9% 78,2% 55,4% 80,0% 86,3%
ATSS X-101 94,3% 73,1% 54,6% 76,0% 78,0% 74,2% 79,6% 57,8% 81,2% 86,8%
Trident R-101 94,0% 70,3% 52,7% 70,9% 79,8% 73,0% 77,6% 55,6% 78,7% 86,8%
Fig. 7. Example of a hybrid installation consisting of a light pole combined
with a CCTV camera. Our TridentNet model works well with a detection
confidence of 97% of the “round class” instance, and avoids the potential
“directed class” false positive represented by the light fixture below the
camera.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss some practical applications of our
present work, as well as some ethical aspects and potential
challenges.
A. Practical applications
1) Fast and accurate CCTV camera annotations: Crowd-
sourcing is a proven and effective method for fast, accurate,
and cost-effective for image labeling and annotation, and
generic computer vision and machine learning tasks [88]–
[92]. Google is using a similar approach integrated into its
reCAPTCHA V2 [93], [94]. As presented in Figure 10, we
Fig. 8. Image alterations with CenterMask (Ground Truth - 3 TP) (left to
right): Original - 3 TP (92%, 83%, 52%); Contrast - 3 TP (92%, 54%, 91%);
Equalizer - 3 TP (84%, 81%, 90%); Exposure - 3 TP (92%, 86%, 73%);
Saturation - 1 TP (85%), 2 FN
Fig. 9. Image alterations with TridentNet (Ground Truth - 1 TP) (left to
right): Original - 1 FN; Contrast - 1 FN; Equalizer - 1 FN; Exposure - 1 FN;
Saturation - 1 FN. NOTE: Undetected TPs are marked with pink circle.
propose an improvement to the current reCAPTCHA V2
system. Our proposed improvement could ask the users of
reCAPTCHA to “Select all images with CCTV cameras”,
hence leveraging reCAPTCHA’s unified infrastructure and
algorithms to better and faster help to annotate and validate
the CCTV camera objects in Google Street View imagery as
well as other image datasets. To our knowledge, at the time
of this writing there is no such publicly available feature in
Google’s reCAPTCHA.
2) Global and instant mapping of CCTV locations and
areas: On the one hand, at present there are multiple projects
and data-sources that provide the geo-location mapping of
CCTV cameras. Some of these projects are open-source and
crowd-sourced [95], [96], while some others are open-data
resources provided by city administrations and country govern-
Fig. 10. Our proposed vision for a novel reCAPTCHA V2 extension offering
“Select all images with CCTV cameras” to better and faster help annotate
and validate the CCTV camera objects in Google Street View imagery.
ments [97]–[100]. However, all of these feature a set of major
limitations, as follows. First, all these approaches cover a very
limited geographical area (e.g., maximum a city). Second, the
data-sources and projects are globally uncoordinated. There-
fore the data formats along with the exposed characteristics
of the respective maps and CCTV cameras vary dramatically
across the board. Third, crowd-sourced project rely heavily
on human contributions of data, while governmental data-
sources rely on human administration of data. Such an ap-
proach is highly unscalable for maintenance and development
of the datasets, and exposes the data to human error and
(un)intentional manipulations. Fourth, those datasets are rarely
kept up-to-date and they inherently cannot reflect the instant
changes in the addition, removal, reposition of CCTV cameras
(e.g., due to infrastructure changes, construction).
On the other hand, our CCTV camera object detector can
be applied to a global source of street-level imagery such as
Google Street View, OpenStreetCam, Mapillary. This allows
fast mapping and localization of most street-level (and even
indoor 3) CCTV cameras, therefore instantly creating and
maintaining a global up-to-date (and historical [102]) map of
CCTV cameras. At the same time, our CCTV camera object
detector can be used to validate the accuracy and truthfulness
of the crowd-sourced and open-data datasets. To achieve this,
3Our approach can also detect and map indoor CCTV cameras thanks to
panoramas in Google Street View supplied by Google and its users [101].
an automated process picks each CCTV camera entry from a
dataset, retrieves the relevant and closest street-level and geo-
tagged imagery, applies our CCTV camera object detector, and
finally validates if the dataset is correct and contains up-to-date
information.
3) CCTV-aware privacy-/safety-focused route planning and
navigation: Once the CCTV cameras can be accurately de-
tected, and instantly located and mapped based on street-level
imagery 4 (see Section V-A2), the system is ready for one
of the most important and relevant application – CCTV-aware
route planning and navigation.
At present, there is a myriad of route planning algorithms,
software, and services 5 [103]–[108]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, none of the currently available algorithms,
software, and services provide CCTV-aware route planning
and navigation. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to propose and work on such features at present, and we are
unaware of any project or service developing or offering such
route planning options.
In Figures 12, 13 we demonstrate some real-world use-cases
of such a CCTV-aware route planner. The samples contain the
mapping and labeling of location, type (e.g., round camera,
directed camera), and field of view. This mapping and labeling
is achieved using the previously detailed CCTV camera object
detectors (Sections III, IV). The user first have the option
to select the type of CCTV-aware routing, as presented in
Figure 11.
Fig. 11. Our proposed vision for a novel map navigation that provides
the users both privacy (“Avoid CCTV Cameras (privacy-first)”) and safety
(“Follow CCTV Cameras (safety-first)”) route planning options.
Then, if the user selects the “Follow CCTV Cameras (safety-
first)” option the system would provide a route as in Figure 12.
As already mentioned, current route planning solutions provide
CCTV-unaware algorithms, therefore the systems we tested
(e.g., Google Maps) provided most of the times the same
non-privacy-friendly route as in Figure 12. At the same time,
with our CCTV-aware route planning proposal, the user may
alternatively select “Avoid CCTV Cameras (privacy-first)”.
4Also can be applied to geo-tagged photos and videos.
5Provided as a wide variety of open-source, closed-source, online, offline,
free, and commercial solutions.
Fig. 12. CCTV-aware routing system providing route for “Follow CCTV
Cameras (safety-first)” user option, routing the user through the hot-spot view
of tens of CCTV cameras. NOTE: We used street-level imagery at the given
geo-location and mapped the real-life positioning of CCTV cameras in the
given area.
Therefore, the system would provide a better route for that
scenario as depicted in Figure 13.
Fig. 13. CCTV-aware routing system providing route for “Avoid CCTV
Cameras (privacy-first)” user option, routing the user away from the “prying
eyes” of tens of CCTV cameras (depicted in light-blue). NOTE: We used
street-level imagery at the given geo-location and mapped the real-life
positioning of CCTV cameras in the given area.
4) Real-time CCTV detection on mobile/IoT devices: Fi-
nally, one more application of the presented object detector is
its use for real-time CCTV camera detection on smartphones,
mobile equipment (e.g., robots, drones), and other IoT/edge
devices (e.g., RaspberryPi, Arduino, ESP32). For this purpose,
our object detectors could be configured and trained for low-
power devices using, for example, TinyML hardware with
TensorFlow Lite [109], [110], and we leave this as part of
our future work. One use-case could be the drones equipped
with tiny/lite versions of our detection models could fly around
the corner or down the street to first detect and map the
CCTV areas. Another use-case could be users equipped with
smartphones or IoT/edge devices that continuously runs the
tiny/lite object detector over the device’s camera video feed.
The device would then alert the user (e.g., via sound, vibration,
light) when it detects in real-time a CCTV camera in its field
of view, therefore providing the user a chance to change course
and make a more informed decision.
In this context, we also tested our system (namely the
ATSS X-101 and Trident R-101 models) against the real-world
journalist experiment by Pasley [2], where the “ground truth”
consists of 39 TPs (i.e., CCTV cameras). Running ATSS X-
101 detector resulted in 33 TPs + 0 FPs + 6 FNs. Applying
Trident R-101 model produced 33 TPs + 1 FPs + 6 FNs. Both
models presented an F1-score of 91.7%, and while their TPs
and FNs counts are the same, the actual distribution of TPs
and FNs across the input images slightly differs. Therefore, we
also evaluated our system using a “sensor fusion” approach,
where the best results from both the detectors (i.e., “sensors”)
are combined (i.e., “fused”) together for an enhanced final
result. In this case, our system achieves 35 TPs + 0 FPs + 4
FNs with an F1-score of 94.6%. A visual results subset from
our experiment can be seen in Appendix A. This therefore
underpins once again that our technology could be useful as
privacy-first early warning system against CCTV cameras for
real-life use by third-parties and users.
B. Technical challenges
Based on our real-world and street imagery observations,
light equipment (e.g., light poles, light fixtures) many time
look very similar to CCTV cameras. This makes it challenging
to certainly distinguish between CCTV cameras and light
equipment even to an experienced human observer. Figure 6,
which is the worst-performing and where most of the False
Positives are in fact light fixtures, is a perfect example that
such a scenario poses challenges to computer vision as well.
At the same time, there seems to be a growing trend to have
streetlights with embedded CCTV cameras [87]. We think this
may pose additional challenges (not insurmountable though)
for most-accurate detection of CCTV cameras in real-life
scenarios.
C. Ethical aspects and potential abuse
On the one hand, there are less technological domains
where a system inspired by our work could be applied. For
example, the case of Novichok (A-234) poisoning in Salisbury
(UK) of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei
Skripal, and his daughter Yulia Skripal, by what is believed
to be two officers of Russian GRU 6 – “Ruslan Boshirov”
(supposed real name Anatoliy Chepiga [111]) and “Alexander
Petrov” (supposed real name Alexander Mishkin [112]) –
is surreal and beyond infamous [113]. Following the attack
and the international diplomatic fallout featuring sanctions
and diplomatic expulsions, the Law Enforcement agencies
and investigative think-tank organizations (e.g., Bellingcat)
reconstructed the complete routes with exact geo-positions,
timestamps, and visual proof of main suspects with the heavy
use of state- and privately-owned CCTV cameras [114]. In
this context, some readers may object that future potential
delinquents could use a system similar to ours in order to
map the CCTV cameras within a planned operation area (if
not already available), and then use it to carefully generate
a specific route that provides close to 100% anonymity. We
argue our point of view on this at the end of this section.
On the other hand, there are offensive cybersecurity sce-
narios (possible but unlikely in the immediate future), where
our technology could be potentially used. The scenario works
under the following attack assumptions:
• it is completely autonomous (i.e., no human operators)
• it involves offensive drones equipped with CCTV camera
object detector (attackers) (see Section V-A4)
• it targets highly-valuable air-gapped network(s) to exfiltrate
data from (victims)
Attack description: The drones use the object detector to
identify CCTV cameras and approach them. Once approached,
the drones would send a “backdoor knock” signal (e.g., visual,
sound, infra-red) to the camera [5], [115]. If a particular
CCTV camera was internally compromised and connected to
an isolated network segment that contains a latent malware
implant (e.g., APT), the malware activates when camera re-
ceives the “backdoor knock” signal. The malware could also
be implanted in the CCTV camera itself via IoT malware
and firmware modifications [6], [116], [117]. To complete the
attack, the drones with such CCTV camera object detection
and data-exfiltration capabilities follow the air-jumper attack
described by Guri and Bykhovsky [115].
All in all, we argue that while our CCTV camera object
detector is designed to be used for positive impact, the
potential of our proposed system being misused is similar and
comparable to any other system (e.g., Kali Linux, Metasploit),
method (e.g., penetration testing, reverse engineering), or
device (e.g., kitchen knives in supermarkets). Additionally,
we argue that the benefits of our system for the majority of
positive impact applications outweigh the risks of misuse for a
fraction of negative impact applications (where we believe the
perpetrators to be able to find other ingenious ways for illegal
or unethical activity, should a system like ours not exist).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented the first state-of-the-art computer
vision object detectors aiming to accurately identify CCTV
6 Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie – Main Directorate of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, formerly the Main
Intelligence Directorate.
cameras in images and video frames. Our object detectors
currently achieve an accuracy between 91,1% – 95,6% To
build our system, we used and evaluated in parallel several
state-of-the-art computer vision frameworks and backbones.
To train our system, we manually collected, triaged and
annotated 3401 CCTV camera images, for a total of 2244
directed class instances and 1742 round class instances.
Furthermore, we presented the first known prototypes of
CCTV-aware route planning and navigation. These prototypes
are motivated and powered by the core object detectors pre-
sented above, and can be used at the same time for both
privacy-first (avoid CCTV cameras) as well as safety-first
(follow CCTV cameras) route planning.
Finally, with this work, we hope to motivate in several
ways the communities of researchers, practitioners, policy-
makers, and end-users. First and more general is to focus
the debates and policy-making related to privacy and safety
of CCTV cameras towards a more science-, technology-
and research-driven ground. Second is to encourage the
improvement of our object detectors and techniques
presented, so that they can be immediately incorporated at a
larger scale, both in cloud and edge applications, and for the
greater privacy benefit. With these in mind, we release the
relevant artefacts (e.g., code, datasets, trained models, and
documentation) at: https://github.com/Fuziih and https://etsin.
fairdata.fi/dataset/d2d2d6e2-0b5c-46e0-8833-53d8a24838a0
(urn:nbn:fi:att:258ce5ad-9501-46b9-a707-c1f59689ee10).
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APPENDIX A
OUR SYSTEM APPLIED TO A REAL-LIFE THIRD-PARTY EXPERIMENT ON CCTV AND PRIVACY BY PASLEY [2]
Fig. 14. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 5 TP; ATSS X-101 - 4 TP, 1 FN; TridentNet R-101 - 4 TP, 1 FN
Fig. 15. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 1 TP; ATSS X-101 - 1 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 1 TP
Fig. 16. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 1 TP; ATSS X-101 - 1 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 1 FN
Fig. 17. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 1 TP; ATSS X-101 - 1 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 1 TP, 1 FP
Fig. 18. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 2 TP; ATSS X-101 - 2 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 2 TP
Fig. 19. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 4 TP; ATSS X-101 - 3 TP, 1 FN; TridentNet R-101 - 3 TP, 1 FN
Fig. 20. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 2 TP; ATSS X-101 - 2 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 2 TP
Fig. 21. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 5 TP; ATSS X-101 - 5 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 4 TP, 1 FN
Fig. 22. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 1 TP; ATSS X-101 - 1 TP; TridentNet R-101 - 1 TP
Fig. 23. Visual results (left to right): Original image (Ground Truth) - 1 TP; ATSS X-101 - 1 FN; TridentNet R-101 - 1 TP. NOTE: When the original
author’s red arrow is removed, it proved quite challenging for humans to quickly detect the CCTV camera as it “hides” behind a corner and blends into the
dark background.
